The Problem:  Deterrence, as defined during the Cold War, is no longer an effective means of preventing the use of nuclear weapons.  Deterrent theory barely prevented their use during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Since then, the theory of mutually assured destruction has continued to age rapidly and systematically until it has largely become obsolete.  The issue of nuclear deterrence will never cease to be important as long as the knowledge of construction or stockpiles exist, or until technology advances to the point that the weapons themselves become as obsolete as the theories that govern their use.  In other words, this will be an issue for a very long time.  No theory of ethics covered in Philosophy 230 can easily grapple with the use of nuclear weapons because, besides being an introductory course in ethics, the theories are focused on the actions of the individual, the individual effects of those actions, and are generally ill suited to dealing with large-scale loss of life.

A significant problem arises when conducting research.  Several decades worth of essays exist contemplating the validity of the peace movement and the rationalizing of nuclear defense.  It is useful, but antiquated.  The theories were written to explain the Cold War and its possible outcomes, not today’s political climate which is vastly more complex.  The number of players in the nuclear game has risen from two to nine (that we know of).  Furthermore, theories of deterrence hinge upon a shared philosophical understanding and a similar value for human life.  This is simply no longer the case as demonstrated during the 9/11 attacks.  The combatants in the war on terror have no home base, no land to lose, and no qualms about death.

The goal of this essay will be to examine nuclear deterrence in light of the philosophers studied in class as well as their current context and applicability.  It is clear that Plato, Kant, Mill, or Sartre would not condone the use of a nuclear weapon.  However, it is through their different methods of reasoning that a more coherent and straightforward case for their controlled renunciation can be made. 

Mutually Assured Destruction

The prevailing theory of the Cold War, mutually assured destruction, or MAD, theory was only effective between two superpowers.  It holds that retaliation is the only means of dissuading a would-be aggressor from launching a first strike.  However, what is the difference between retaliation and revenge?  One can be justified according to ethical principles while the other stems from irrational and emotional reasoning.  Reprisal, even if intended to prove the theory true, is simply gratuitous destruction, incapable of easing suffering, but provides a false sense of justice (Yoder 80).  Mutually assured destruction theory allows more nukes to be aimed at civilians in the hopes of the making losses so catastrophic that it makes war unthinkable.  “Collateral damage was frequently regarded as a bonus rather than a moral or practical problem” (Martin 49). 

MAD theory relies on the idea that the enemy has a similar philosophy, as well as a similar stake in their use.  MAD theory provided a deterrent, but also a means of validating a first strike scenario.  Moral reservations were tabled in favor of the potential advantage of attacking first.  As long as there were a few civilians left and resources intact, a first strike made perfect sense.  It limits the extent to which an enemy should be annihilated, but also holds no one back from hitting first and asking questions later.  The only losers are the civilians who have no control over the decision.

The implication of civilian involvement in the war effort makes them valid targets according to this theory.  Mutually assured destruction makes targeting civilians a virtue because it strengthens the idea of deterrence by destruction.  Under scrutiny however, it can never be justified to target civilians in this way.  Regardless of the level of civilian participation in warfare, they cannot be assumed to be of one mind and one body.  During the Cold War, the assumption of enemy dissimilarity and enemy unity justified nuclear build up.  The modern nuclear powers are not polarized the way that the United States and USSR were.  Free nuclear states are armed for their own defense against multiple adversaries, not one foe.  Applying mutually assured destruction theory to today’s environment creates an image of a Mexican standoff, with all nuclear-armed countries eyeing each other suspiciously but unwilling to pull the trigger.  It leads to a dangerous bluff.   If the first strike bonus outweighs the potential retaliation, or if the aggressor believes that the victim will not retaliate, they will strike.  It is calling the bluff to see whether or not a world power has the fortitude to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation. 

State of Play

I am neither a political science major nor am I heavily invested in the news.  However I do have a functioning knowledge of current events and a general feeling of apprehension about the future.  I approach the issue of deterrence with a healthy amount of fear.  There are simply no valid reasons for a country or group to maintain a functional nuclear deterrent.  The risks are too great, but they still do it.  Maintaining an arsenal breeds the idea of nuclear equality and inequality.  It also instills the notion that the only way to attack a nuclear power is with a nuclear weapon.  It fosters an air of the haves and have-nots.  As a result, the issue of uranium enrichment and development of launch technology continues to plague the United Nations. 

            Ironically, it is the United Nations itself that has allowed the building of nuclear weapons to occur.  Not much could be done during the Cold War, but today the military wing of the UN has its own deterrent force of bombers.  The reason for this is economic and societal.  Maintenance of conventional forces is expensive and ineffective against nuclear weapons.  It was cheaper to build nukes than it was to train soldiers, and why train them at all if intercontinental missiles will fight the next war? Taxpayers forced the issue: the UN simply went along with the popular vote.

One of the ways to gain a seat on the Security Council is to maintain a nuclear arsenal, and cheaper than amassing an army.  Beyond that, it is a guaranteed way to make opinions heard and be sure that threats are heeded.  For example, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has a gained a considerable amount of diplomatic weight for even toying with a nuclear power program which he maintains is a peaceful and domestic power supply.  A nuke is a proven means of making a voice, even one as controversial as Ahmadinejad’s, very compelling.  As long as nuclear weapons are used as a benchmark for the value or worth of a country in the UN power structure, developing nations will continue to try to catch up with the rest of the nuclear powers.  The aura of deterrence is simply a case of having the cake and eating it too.  Maintaining a nuclear deterrent in the form of a nuclear weapon seems like the logical way to make the prospect of attack unappetizing, but it actually ups the ante for states looking to have their grievances heard.

            Meanwhile, the governments of nuclear states are continually forced to question the value of their nuclear deterrents.  The UK has had a very serious debate over the necessity of their nuclear missile submarines.  Former Prime Minister Tony Blair said that it would be “unwise and dangerous” for the UK to abandon its weapons.  This mirrors President Barack Obama’s recent comments on nuclear disarmament in Prague.  The goal remains to build a nuclear free world, but Obama was quick to leave himself room to maneuver by asserting “the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”  He also pointed out the way that our attitudes can impact the future of arms development.  It is true that “if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable,” which is tantamount to allowing the world to continue on an outdated arms race.  Build up is in direct opposition to the ethics surrounding weapons of mass destruction, and worth fighting against. 

The Just War, or Pacifism

            Arguing on mass destruction from a Kantian perspective, one finds two distinct routes: proportionality and renunciation.  The principle of proportionality revolves around Kant’s Just War Theory, that the reasons for entering a conflict should be equivalent to the means used to take up that war- jus ad bellum.  Once engaged however, it is unclear whether or not a war should be followed through to its conclusion (Martin 51).  This theory applies very well to western concepts of conventional warfare.  But the use of the bomb has only been justified twice, on August 6th and 9th 1945. 

Renunciation tries to face the bitter legacy of the Cold War by acknowledging that we have immeasurable destructive power while trying to believe that we will never use it again.  But we cannot seem to disarm ourselves.  This results in a sort of nuclear ransom, where the unscrupulous are left holding the nuclear gun to our figurative head.  We can only hope that they will see the folly in their actions and choose to abandon the wholesale destruction of their enemies.  It requires a great deal of faith in human nature, which makes the just war theory more palatable, even if marginally so.

Retaliation, or flexible response as NATO calls it, is one answer.  It is the limited use of nuclear weapons in response to an equal attack or a substantially warranted preventative first strike.  It doesn’t solve the problem.  It is a derivative of mutual destruction theory.  It flies in the face of the categorical imperative.  Retaliation cannot be applied as a universal maxim; otherwise one attack would lead to world devastation.  Launching a first strike cannot be universalized either because it treats civilian populations as a means to an end, ending a war.  The capacity to live as a rational being includes a respect for that capacity.  To employ a nuclear weapon, even if aimed at a valid military target, is to deny that respect for rational agency and ignore the implications contradicting morality. 

Kant may find a way to justify conventional conflict, but nuclear war is waged on a scale that overwhelms the categorical imperative.  To question the firing of a nuke for a moment is to never fire one at all.  The implications are too great.  However, Judeo-Christian ethics continue to try to reconcile themselves with nuclear combat.  There are too many moral reasons for hesitating to attack.  Just War cannot allow their use, but pacifism is ineffective.  Once we have the knowledge, it cannot be unlearned.  Like a bully who realizes that he can close his hand into a fist, he cannot unlearn it.  He can modify his behavior, but he will forever have the capability for expressing violence in this way. 

Utility and Destruction

The principle of utility according to Mill is that the right act has the best consequences and the best consequences provide the most welfare, benefit, or pleasure to the greatest number.  Simply, what’s right serves the good.  The greatest good to the greatest number would never allow for the use of a nuclear weapon.  The damage to the innocent would be incalculable.  There would be no circumstance when it would acceptable to fire a nuclear missile.  Warfare as a concept is almost impossible under utilitarian ethics.  Proportionality of suffering, a dead soldier’s family for example, is still reason enough to renounce weapons of mass destruction. 

Making the Choice

If we are the sum of our choices, who would make the choice to launch a nuclear missile?  According to existentialist philosophy, with its underlying themes of isolation and angst, to make such a choice would be to radically assert a self-other relationship.  In deciding to attack the feeling of anguish, or the existential weight of responsibility, would be extraordinary.  Although there is a very strict chain of command, it is ultimately a decision that is made totally alone.  Command in a nuclear submarine must also be forlorn place.   

When we choose, we commit ourselves to values and we can only choose for ourselves.  We choose what is valuable to us and by extension what all others should value in the same situation.  We are implicitly choosing for mankind.  If that is the case, the president choosing to launch a nuke is the president making the choice not only for the entire nation, but also for the world.  But we never choose what is evil, we always see some sort of good in it.  What could be good about launching a weapon like that?  The answer is nothing, which is something existentialists have come to understand relatively well. 

Catastrophic Consequences

The results of ignoring the changes in nuclear proliferation are dangerous.  The old theories of nuclear deployment no longer apply.  The theories of ethics studied in philosophy 230 show that the use of nuclear weapons has high moral costs as well as the potential for destruction.  Deterrence must shift away from weapons development to conventional defense and increased education.  However, nuclear weapons will never cease to be a cornerstone of international defense.  Until they are seen for what they really are, blunt tools of destruction, instead of a measure of sophistication they will remain a sticking point for international relations. 

Deterrence will keep its place in foreign policy.  It cannot be changed quickly, and arguably will never fully disappear.  Until the weapons themselves are made obsolete, philosophy must struggle to cope with their existence.  If nothing else, we must learn to accept nuclear weapons and the theories governing their use as an imperfect solution to a complex problem.  Until humanity moves past violence, or science develops force fields, the case for renunciation must be made. 

I worked on my philosophy of art paper until 3am last night.  I got about 2 and a half pages, nearly three, done but felt confident that I could finish it before this afternoon.  If not, I could easily email it late this evening and if work runs late I could just pass it in tomorrow.  No big deal.

I struggled to get up this morning.  I succeeded only 15 minutes later than I usually get out of bed.  I had french toast for breakfast.  I packed my things and started my car.  I waited 10 minutes to let the engine warm up, then I got in and drove to school I arrive a 9:00 almost to the minute.  I got out and looked in the back seat.  There was nothing there. 

I thought I was hallucinating for a moment.  I could practically see the outlines where my laptop and backpack were supposed to be.  I stood in shock for 5 seconds then started walking to the union.  I did the math in my head:  9:00 now, 45 minutes home and 45 minutes back is 10:30.  Subtract 10 minutes for the walk from the parking lot and any extra time due to traffic (find a new parking spot).  It was simply not worth the time and gasoline. 

I went to the campus bookstore and bought a notebook, $2.69.  I walked to the oakes room and bought a coffee$1.82. 

That sums up the last 8 hours of my life right up to this moment in the library.  I'm staying positive but I'm most certainly pissed.  I'm not angry, just frustrated.  Very frustrated.